

Verifiably Robust Conformal Prediction (NeurIPS 2024)

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Introduction

- Conformal Prediction provides prediction sets that guarantee a user-specified probability under the assumption that training and test data are exchangeable.
- Nevertheless, this guarantee is violated when the data is subjected to adversarial attacks.
- This paper proposes **VRCP (Verifiably Robust Conformal Prediction)**, a new framework that leverages recent *neural network verification* methods to recover coverage guarantees under adversarial attacks.

Preliminaries

Notation

- $\mathbf{X} \subset \mathbb{R}^d$ and Y : a feature space and label space.
- $\mathcal{D} = \{(\mathbf{x}_1, y_1), \dots, (\mathbf{x}_m, y_m)\}$: i.i.d. sampled dataset.
- $\mathcal{D}_{train}, \mathcal{D}_{cal}$: a disjoint training and calibration sets where $\mathcal{D}_{train} \cup \mathcal{D}_{cal} = \mathcal{D}$ and $n = |\mathcal{D}_{cal}|$.
- f : a predictor fitted on \mathcal{D}_{train}
- $S_f : (\mathbf{X}, Y) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$: a score function, such as
 - when f is a classifier $S_f(\mathbf{x}, y) = 1 - f(\mathbf{x})_y$ where $f(\cdot)_y$ being y 's predicted likelihood.
- $B_p(\mathbf{x}, \epsilon)$: the ϵ -ball centered at $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^d$ with respect to the p -norm $\|\cdot\|_p$.

Adversarial Attacks

- Intentionally adding imperceptible noise can degrade the performance of an AI model.
- This type of attack is called an "adversarial attack."




Figure 1: An example of an adversarial attack.
From : Goodfellow, I. J. (2014). Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples

- Various approaches have been proposed to verify the robustness of NNs against adversarial attacks.
- The main target of these approaches is to find a verifier that computes a valid but not exact bound when a given neural network f is subjected to a perturbation within ϵ , such that :

$$f(\mathbf{x})_y^{\perp} \leq \inf_{\mathbf{x}' \in B_p(\mathbf{x}, \epsilon)} \{f(\mathbf{x}')_y\}, \quad f(\mathbf{x})_y^{\top} \geq \sup_{\mathbf{x}' \in B_p(\mathbf{x}, \epsilon)} \{f(\mathbf{x}')_y\}. \quad (1)$$

- This paper adopts and utilizes **CROWN**, the state-of-the-art (SotA) method in this field.

- Given a calibration set \mathcal{D}_{cal} , a test input \mathbf{x}_{test} , and a score function $S(\cdot, \cdot)$.
- Let $s_i = S(\mathbf{x}_i, y_i)$
- We construct the score distribution with calibration sets as :

$$F = \frac{\delta_\infty}{n+1} + \sum_{(\mathbf{x}_i, y_i) \in \mathcal{D}_{cal}} \frac{\delta_{s_i}}{n+1}, \quad (2)$$

where δ_s is the Dirac distribution with parameter s , and δ_∞ represents the unknown score (potentially infinite) of the test point.

- Given a miscoverage/error rate α and a test point $(\mathbf{x}_{test}, \mathbf{y}_{test})$.
- Then, the prediction set $C(\mathbf{x}_{test})$ is defined as:

$$C(\mathbf{x}_{test}) = \{y \in Y : S_f(\mathbf{x}_{test}, y) \leq Q_{1-\alpha}(F)\}, \quad (3)$$

where $Q_{1-\alpha}(F)$ is the $1 - \alpha$ quantile of F .

Conformal Prediction and Adversarial Attacks

- $C(x_{test})$ satisfies the marginal coverage guarantee if the test point and the calibration points are exchangeable.
- However, when the data is subjected to adversarial attacks, this guarantee no longer holds.




Figure 2: With a target coverage of 0.9, marginal coverage and average set-size obtained by vanilla conformal prediction, evaluated on the test set of CIFAR10. [1]

Verifiably Robust Conformal Prediction (VRCP)

- Given \mathcal{D}_{cal} , f , $S(\cdot, \cdot)$ and a test input \mathbf{x}_{test} .
- compute the prediction set for \mathbf{x}_{test} as follows.
 1. For each $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ we compute,

$$s^\perp(\mathbf{x}_{test}, y) = 1 - f(\mathbf{x}_{test})_y^\top \leq \inf_{\mathbf{x}' \in B(\mathbf{x}_{test}, \epsilon)} S(\mathbf{x}', y) \quad (4)$$

2. The robust prediction set is then defined as

$$C_\epsilon(\mathbf{x}_{test}) = \left\{ y : s^\perp(\mathbf{x}_{test}, y) \leq Q_{1-\alpha}(F) \right\} \quad (5)$$

- Below, the authors show that we are able to maintain the marginal coverage guarantee for any ℓ_p -norm bounded adversarial attack.

Theorem 3.1

Let $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_{test} = \mathbf{x}_{test} + \boldsymbol{\delta}$ for a clean test sample \mathbf{x}_{test} and $\|\boldsymbol{\delta}\|_p \leq \epsilon$. The prediction set $C_\epsilon(\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_{test})$ defined in Eq. (5) satisfies $\mathbb{P}[y_{test} \in C_\epsilon(\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_{test})] \geq 1 - \alpha$.

Proof :

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{P}[y_{test} \in C_\epsilon(\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_{test})] &= \mathbb{P}\left[s^\perp(\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_{test}, y_{test}) \leq Q_{1-\alpha}(F)\right] \\ &\geq \mathbb{P}\left[\inf_{\mathbf{x}' \in B_\epsilon(\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_{test})} S(\mathbf{x}', y_{test}) \leq Q_{1-\alpha}(F)\right] \quad \text{by Eq. (4)} \\ &\geq \mathbb{P}[S(\mathbf{x}_{test}, y_{test}) \leq Q_{1-\alpha}(F)] \geq 1 - \alpha. \quad \square\end{aligned}$$

- Given \mathcal{D}_{cal} , f , $S(\cdot, \cdot)$ and a test input \mathbf{x}_{test} .
- compute the prediction set for \mathbf{x}_{test} as follows.
 1. We compute the upper-bound score distribution with calibration sets as:

$$F^\top = \frac{\delta_\infty}{(n+1)} + \sum_{(\mathbf{x}_i, y_i) \in \mathcal{D}_{cal}} \frac{\delta_{s_i^\top}}{n+1}, \text{ where } s_i^\top \geq \sup_{\mathbf{x}' \in B_p(\mathbf{x}_i, \epsilon)} S(\mathbf{x}', y_i) \quad (6)$$

2. The robust prediction set is then defined as

$$C_\epsilon(\mathbf{x}_{test}) = \left\{ y : S(\mathbf{x}_{test}, y) \leq Q_{1-\alpha}(F^\top) \right\} \quad (7)$$

Theorem 3.2

Let $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_{test} = \mathbf{x}_{test} + \boldsymbol{\delta}$ for a clean test sample \mathbf{x}_{test} and $\|\boldsymbol{\delta}\|_p \leq \epsilon$. The prediction set $C_\epsilon(\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_{test})$ defined in Eq. (7) satisfies $\mathbb{P}[y_{test} \in C_\epsilon(\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_{test})] \geq 1 - \alpha$.

Proof :

$$\begin{aligned}
 \mathbb{P}[y_{test} \in C_\epsilon(\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_{test})] &= \mathbb{P}\left[S(\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_{test}, y_{test}) \leq Q_{1-\alpha}(F^\top)\right] \\
 &\geq \mathbb{P}\left[S(\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_{test}, y_{test}) \leq Q_{1-\alpha}\left(\left\{\sup_{\mathbf{x}' \in B_\epsilon(\mathbf{x}_i)} S(\mathbf{x}', y_i)\right\}_{(\mathbf{x}_i, y_i) \in \mathcal{D}_{cal}} \cup \{\infty\}\right)\right] \\
 &\geq \mathbb{P}\left[\sup_{\mathbf{x}' \in B_\epsilon(\mathbf{x}_{test})} S(\mathbf{x}', y_{test}) \leq Q_{1-\alpha}\left(\left\{\sup_{\mathbf{x}' \in B_\epsilon(\mathbf{x}_i)} S(\mathbf{x}', y_i)\right\}_{(\mathbf{x}_i, y_i) \in \mathcal{D}_{cal}} \cup \{\infty\}\right)\right] \\
 &\geq 1 - \alpha. \quad \square
 \end{aligned}$$

Experiments

Experiments

- **Dataset** : CIFAR10, CIFAR100, TinyImageNet
- **Models** : CNN model
- **Attacks** : PGD attack. ℓ_2 -norm bounded attacks with $\epsilon = 0.02$ or $\epsilon = 0.03$.
- Target coverage : $1 - \alpha = 0.9$, repeated 50 times.
- **Results**

Method	CIFAR10		CIFAR100		TinyImageNet	
	Coverage	Size	Coverage	Size	Coverage	Size
Vanilla	0.878±0.002	1.721±0.008	0.890±0.002	6.702±0.058	0.886±0.002	38.200±0.252
RSCP+	1.000±0.000	10.000±0.000	1.000±0.000	100.000±0.000	1.000±0.000	200.000±0.000
RSCP+ (PTT)	0.983±0.008	8.357±0.780	0.925±0.010	26.375±9.675	0.931±0.013	90.644±20.063
VRCP-I	0.986±0.000	4.451±0.011	0.971±0.001	22.530±0.107	0.958±0.001	72.486±0.311
VRCP-C	0.995±0.000	5.021±0.010	0.983±0.000	23.676±0.131	0.965±0.001	77.761±0.352

End